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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no determinitive constitutional provisions or
statutes.
STATEMENT

FACTS

Appellant, Embassy Group, Inc. (appellant) incorporates
its statement of facts set forth in its initial Brief and stands by
the accuracy of those facts.

(AppelJ ant's Brief pp. 3-6).
ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANT MARSHALED ALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT BEFORE
DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
In Argument I of their Brief, appeJ ] ees argi le appel ] ant
has failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the Trial
court's findings before demonstrating that the findings are clearly
erroneous. Having failed to marshal all the evidence, the argument
goes, this court should not disturb the Trial court's findings.
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

However, appellees

do little more than invoke theraarsnaJLingof evidence requirement
and do not address appellants7 arguments with respect to each of
the findings it claims are clearly erroneous.

Appellant argues

that four of the Trial court's specif i c Findings of Fact are
clearly erroneous.

Appellees simply claim appellant failed to

marshal evidence and cite appellant's argument with respect to
Finding of F'act No
marshal.

; as an "examp] e" of appellant's failure to

As shown below, appellant did marshal all evidence in

1

favor of Finding No. 7, and all evidence in favor of the other
three findings appellant claims are clearly erroneous.
In its initial Brief, appellant argued, in the following
order, that the Trial court's findings Nos. 7, 14, 11 and 13 are
clearly erroneous.

Finding of fact No. 7 reads:

7.
All of the written documentation
concerning the sale of Lot 33 to the
defendants indicates that the purchase price
was $40,000.00.
(Tr. 172).

Contrary to appellees7 argument, the only documents

which contain a sale price for Lot 33 are two Earnest Money Sales
Agreements, PI. Ex. 5 and PI. Ex. 6.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6 is

the Earnest Money Sales Agreement which was ultimately executed by
appellant and appellees.

Both Earnest Money Sales Agreements

provide that only "a portion" of Lot 33 was agreed to be sold to
appellees

for

$40,000.00.

(See Argument

III, pp. 26-29 of

Appellant's Brief)
No other documents show a sale price for Lot 33.

The

Warranty Deed cited by appellees in their Brief, while conveying
all of Lot 33, does not show a sale price. The Trust Deed Note and
accompanying Trust Deed also cited by appellees do not show that
the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00.

The Note and Deed

only show that the Hatches executed a Deed of Trust to all of Lot
33 in favor of appellant to secure repayment on a Trust Deed Note
in the amount of $20,000.00. Nowhere in the Note is it indicated
that the purchase

price

for all of Lot

33 was $40,000.00.

Appellant cited these same documents and made these same arguments
in its initial Brief.
2

Appellee also cites to "Sellers Closing Statement", PI.
Ex. 7; "Purchasers7 Closing statement" D. Ex. 1; "FSB Loan Proceeds
Breakdown", D. Ex. 3; and "Title Insurance Policy", D. Ex. 2.

It

should be noted at the outset that none of these documents
constitute a contract for the purchase of Lot 33. Again, the only
documents constituting such a contract are the Earnest Money Sales
Agreements which provided that only a portion of Lot 3 3 was to be
purchased

for $40,000.00.

In any case, none of these four

documents indicate the purchase price for all of Lot 33 was
$40,000.00.

The "Purchasers' Closing Statement" and "Seller's

Closing Statement", D. Ex. 1 and PI. Ex. 7 respectively, simply
indicate a purchase price of $40,000.00 for an address and not a
lot number.

Neither the "Title Insurance Policy" nor "FSB Loan

Proceeds Breakdown", D. Ex. 2 and D. Ex. 3 respectively, contain a
figure of $40,000.00 anywhere in the documents.

Appellant cited

these documents and made these same arguments in its initial Brief.
(See Argument III pp. 26-29 of appellant's Brief).
As to appellees' claim that the "trial transcript" is
replete with testimony and evidence to support the Trial court's
finding that the sale price of Lot 33 was $40,000.00", the Trial
court's finding of fact No. 7 was that "the written documentation"
indicated a purchase price of $40,000.00. Accordingly, the trial
testimony as to the purchase price of Lot 33 is a irrelevant as it
relates to Finding of Fact No. 7.
Finding of Fact No. 14 reads:
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all the
loan and closing documents prepared by the
3

plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of
Lot 33 was $40,000.00.
(Tr. 173).
As discussed above, both Earnest Money Sales Agreements
provide for the sell of only a portion of Lot 3 3 for $40,000.00.
That portion was described as .9992 acres in PI. Exs. 1 and 4.
Also as discussed above, the loan and closing documents do not
indicate the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nowhere in
either the Purchasers7 Statement or Sellers' Statement is there an
indication that the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nor
do the loan documents referred to in Finding No. 14 indicate the
purchase price for Lot 3 3 was $40,000.00. The documents, D. Exs.
3 and 4, simply indicate appellant was to receive $20,000.00 from
appellees' loan from First Security Bank and authorized such a
disbursement.

Accordingly, Finding of Fact No. 14 is clearly

erroneous because neither the Earnest Money Sales Agreement nor
loan and closing documents indicate the purchase price for Lot 33
was $40,000.00.

(See Argument III, pp. 26-29 of appellant's

Brief).
Finding of Fact No. 11 reads:
11. The court also found defendant Maureen
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness
particularly when she testified that it was
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was
$40,000.00.
(Tr. 173).

As argued in appellant's initial brief, at no time

during Maureen Hatch's testimony did she testify
understanding the cost of Lot 33 was $40,000.00.

it was her

Since Maureen

Hatch never testified it was her understanding the cost of Lot 33
4

was $40,000,00, such a finding that she did so testify is clearly
erroneous.

Appellees do not cite any evidence to the contrary in

their Response Brief.
Finding of Fact No. 13 reads:
13. The court is convinced that if defendant
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he
was buying it for $40,000.00.
(Tr. 173). As argued in appellant's initial Brief, at no point
during Mr. Hatch's testimony did he testify he told his wife he was
buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00. Nor, was there any other testimony
at trial indicating Mr. Hatch told his wife he was buying Lot 33
for $40,000.00.

Since there is no testimony indicating Mr. Hatch

told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00 a finding of fact
that Mr. Hatch did make this statement is clearly erroneous.
Again, appellees cite no contrary evidence in their Response Brief.

II
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AS TO THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR LOT 33; NOR DID THE
TRIAL COURT MAKE A FINDING THAT THE DOCUMENTATION
ESTABLISHED SUCH A MEETING OF THE MINDS
In Argument II of their Response Brief, appellees respond
to appellant's Argument IA in its initial Brief where it was argued
there was no meeting of minds as to the purchase price for all of
Lot 33.

Although appellees cite different cases and attempt to

distinguish those cases cited by appellants, they nevertheless
acknowledge that before there is an enforceable contract there must
be a meeting of the minds between the parties thereto. Pinaree v.
5

Continental Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P. 2d 13 17 (Utah 1975).
Appellees make two arguments to support their claim that
there was a meeting of the minds between appellant and appellees.
First, appellees claim that if there was no meeting of the minds as
to the terms of the parties' agreement in this case, "it would seem
inconsistent that appellants would have directed the preparation of
the closing documents as they did, and wholly implausible that they
would execute and record them."

Second appellees state that the

"record and the exhibits received into evidence at trial clearly
support the court's finding that the documentary evidence of this
transaction contemplated a $40,000.00 purchase price." (Appellees'
Response Brief p. 15-16).
Neither of appellees arguments establish a meeting of the
minds between appellant and appellees.

First, whether or not

appellant "directed the preparation of the closing documents", a
proposition which is not clearly supported by the evidence, is
irrelevant to whether there was a meeting of the minds between the
parties as to the purchase price for Lot 33.

As discussed in

Argument I in this Brief and Argument IA of appellant's initial
Brief, the only documents which contain a purchase price for Lot 33
are the two Earnest Money Sales Agreements.

(PI. Exs. 5 and 6).

Again, both Earnest Money Sales Agreements provide that only "a
portion" of Lot 3 3 was to be sold to appellees for $40,000.00.
Second, the record and exhibits received into evidence at
trial do not clearly support the court's finding that the parties
had a meeting of the minds as to the purchase price for all of Lot
6

33.

Appellee Daryl Hatch did testify that he understood the

purchase price for all of Lot 33 was to be only $40,000.00.
However, there is a significant amount of trial testimony, as well
as the two Earnest Money Sales Agreements, which conflict with
appellee Daryl Hatch's testimony.

This evidence is specifically

set forth an discussed at length in appellant's initial Brief at
pp. 9-14.

Most significantly, the Trial court concluded at trial

that there was no meeting of the minds between appellant and
appellees.

The Trial court found both parties to be honest in

their belief that the terms of the transaction were as each
testified, yet provided no relief to appellant even though the
court concluded appellees received a parcel of land valued at
$80,000.00 for only $40,000.00. (R. 305; 307-308 Tr. 161-162; see
also Brief of appellant pp. 14-18).
Ill
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO PRECLUDE
APPELLANT'S EQUITABLE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In Argument III of their Response Brief, appellees argue
the Trial court properly refused to consider plaintiff's claims in
equity because they were barred by the statute of frauds.

This

argument is of no avail to appellees and it is clear appellees
misstate or do not understand the application of the statute of
frauds.

First, no where in the record does the Trial court state

that the basis for denying equitable relief to appellant was that
the statute of frauds precludes equitable relief.

7

Second,

the

statute

of

frauds

does

not

apply

to

appellants equitable claim of unjust enrichment as appellees
argue.

Appellees correctly cite the general proposition that for

a contract for the sell of real property to be enforceable it must
be in writing. Appellees next claim that H[t]here is absolutely no
written documentation or corroboration that complies with the
statute

to

support

a

finding

that

the

purchase

price

was

$80,000.00. . . . [and that] [l]egal mandate requires that in order
to succeed in their argument for an additional $40,000.00, such
agreement must comply with the requirements set forth in U.C.A.
§25-5-1." (Appellees' Response Brief p. 19). However, appellant's
unjust enrichment claim is not a legal action to enforce a contract
for the sell of real property.1 In fact, recovery under unjust
enrichment presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract
exists.

Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Crt. App. 1987).

Accordingly, the statute of frauds does not preclude appellant's
equitable claim of unjust enrichment.
Finally,

throughout

Argument

III,

appellees

again

mischaracterized the evidence presented at trial. Appellees state
that all the closing documents and various trial exhibits reflect
Appellant did allege in the alternative an oral contract
existed between appellant and appellees for the sale of all of Lot
33 for $80,000.00 and that due to either full or part performance
of appellant such an agreement was taken outside the statute of
frauds. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of
law on this particular claim.
(See Argument II of appellant's
initial brief wherein appellant argued the Trial court failed to
make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions denying
Embassy relief).
However, this claim was asserted in the
alternative to and is independent of appellant's unjust enrichment
claim.
8

that the purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00.

Further,

footnote 3 on page 17 of appellees' Brief reads:
Embassy's
witness
Mark
Wahlquist
also
testified that only plaintiff's Exhibit 6
[Earnest Money Agreement] was prepared and
delivered to Hatches for the sale of the
property. (R. 55).
The document clearly
state? the 5cge PVJQS W3S tofre$4Q,QQQ,oo.
(Appellees' Response Brief, p. 17, Fn. 3 (emphasis added))*

As

discussed previously in this Reply Brief and in appellant's initial
Brief, the only documents introduced into evidence reflecting a
sale price for Lot 3 3 were the two Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
And, contrary to appellees' representation, these documents do not
"clearly" state the sale price for Lot 33 at $40,000.00. Rather,
the Earnest Money Sales Agreements provide that only "a portion" of
Lot 33 was to be sold to appellees for $40,000.00 (PI. Exs. 5 and
6).
IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT RESTITUTION DAMAGES
TO APPELLANT ON ITS UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
Appellees argue in Argument IV of their Response Brief
that the Trial court properly refused to grant appellant relief on
its unjust enrich claim. In so arguing, appellees make two points.
One,

the courts will deny claims for restitution under quasi

contract when an express contract covers the subject matter of
litigation.

Two, the court was

9

justified

in not reforming

instruments for the benefit of appellant.2

Appellant addresses

each of these points as follows.
First, appellant acknowledges that quasi contract or
unjust enrichment is generally not applicable where there is a
clear and express contract covering the subject matter of the
litigation, and in fact acknowledged this in its citation of the
law at pp. 16 and 17 of appellant's initial Brief.

However, the

main point in appellant's argument is that there was no clear and
express contract, satisfying the requirements of mutual assent and
meeting

of

litigation.

the

minds, covering

the

subject

matter

of

this

This is supported by both the facts and the Trial

court's findings. (See Argument I, pp. 8-15 of appellant's Brief).
Second,

appellees' second

point

in Argument

IV

is

referring to reformation of instruments to correct mutual or
unilateral mistakes. Appellants did allege mutual mistake at trial
and requested the court reform the parties' contract should the
court find that such a contract existed.
alleged

in

the

alternative

to

and

appellant's unjust enrichment claim.3

However, this claim was

is wholly

separate

from

Accordingly, the law cited

2

Appellees also claim in Argument IV that "appellants would
like to have the court accept that the parties agreed to enter into
some kind of conspiracy to deceive the lender into believing that
the Lot was being purchased for $40,000.00
rather than
$80,000.00." (Brief of appellees, p. 22). There is absolutely no
evidence suggesting appellant's knowingly entered into a conspiracy
to deceive any lending institution of appellees much less evidence
indicating appellant's would like this court or would have liked
the Trial court to accept this proposition.
3

It should also be noted the trial court failed to make a
finding of fact on appellant's reformation of contract claim. (See
Argument II, pp. 20-26 of Appellant's Brief).
10

by appellees on Reaffirmation is not applicable to an unjust
enrichment claim which presupposes no express and enforceable
contract*
CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

foregoing

arguments,

appellant

respectfully requests this court reverse the Trial court and enter
judgment

in

$40,000.00.

favor

of

appellant

and

against

appellees

for

In the alternative, appellant respectfully requests

this court to remand this case to the Trial court for specific and
adequate findings of fact on all of appellant's claims.
DATED this / / d a y of January, 1993.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

IEINZ J. MAHLER
KIRK G. GIBBS
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellees
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